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THE CANARY-BLIND CONSTITUTION:
MUST GOVERNMENT IGNORE RACIAL
INEQUALITY?
KIM FORDE-MAZRUI*
I
INTRODUCTION
For centuries, coal miners took canaries into the mine to alert them that
1
atmospheric conditions were dangerously toxic. If the canary showed signs of
2
distress, it was time to get out. The miner’s canary has been used as a metaphor
to describe the signal provided by observed disparities between racial groups
3
along socioeconomic dimensions. Black people experiencing disproportionate
disadvantage suggests the presence of systemic underlying “toxic” conditions
that correlate with race. The metaphor can be applied to infant mortality
rates—a statistic long recognized as indicating a population’s overall health and
4
well-being. A black infant in America today is up to three times more likely
5
than a white infant to die in her first year of life. Additionally, despite
landmark gains in civil rights in the 1960s, the racial gap in infant mortality has
6
consistently increased since then. The disparity widens further as comparisons
proceed up the socioeconomic ladder; that is, the ratio of black-to-white infant
mortality rates is larger among the middle class than among members of lower
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1. LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER’S CANARY 1 (2003).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, THE WORLD FACTBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2091rank.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2015).
5. See Donald G. McNeil Jr., Broad Racial Disparities Seen in Americans’ Ills, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
13, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/14/health/14cdc.html?_r=0.
6. MARIAN F. MACDORMAN & T.J. MATHEWS, NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS,
UNDERSTANDING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN U.S. INFANT MORTALITY RATES 1 (Sept.
2011), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/databriefs/db74.pdf.
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socioeconomic classes. In fact, infant mortality rates for college-educated black
8
women are higher than those for white women without a high school diploma.
Moreover, for white women, infant mortality rates are higher for recent
immigrants than for women born to several-generation families, whereas for
9
black and other women of color, the opposite is true.
The causes of racial disparities in infant mortality and related perinatal
conditions, such as premature birth and low birth weight, are more complex and
10
uncertain.
Immediate causes of infant mortality include congenital
abnormalities, pregnancy complications, respiratory distress syndrome, and
11
sudden infant death syndrome (SIDS). As to why such maladies correlate with
race, studies have found an association between perinatal problems and a range
of socioeconomic factors disproportionately experienced by black Americans,
such as living in segregated neighborhoods marked by poverty, unemployment,
12
violent crime, and single-parent households. Such conditions tend to intensify
physical and emotional stress in pregnant women and contribute to maladaptive
13
coping strategies, including smoking, substance abuse, and poor nutrition. Low
socioeconomic status is also associated with lack of access to prenatal care and
14
infant parenting education. Studies also find consistently that, even controlling
for insurance status and income, minorities receive lower-quality care than
15
whites. One explanation is that racial bias or cultural ignorance on the part of
health-care providers affects the quality of prenatal and other medical care
16
provided to black mothers. Still other studies point to beliefs common among
some black communities that can deter accessing medical care, such as mistrust

7. Paula Braveman, Racial Disparities at Birth: The Puzzle Persists, 24 ISSUES SCI. & TECH., no. 2,
Winter 2008, http://issues.org/24-2/p_braveman/.
8. Ziba Kashef, Why African American babies have the highest infant mortality rate in the
developed world, THE BLACK COMMENTATOR, no. 32, Mar. 6, 2003, http://www.blackcommentator
.com/32/32_reprint.html (“College- and graduate-school educated black mothers have a higher infant
mortality rate than white moms who didn’t finish high school.”).
9. Richard David & James Collins, Jr., Disparities in Infant Mortality: What’s Genetics Got to Do
With It?, 97 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1191, 1193 (2007); Braveman, supra note 7 (observing that black and
Hispanic immigrants have better birth outcomes than their U.S.-born daughters despite the latter
generally having higher socioeconomic status).
10. See Debbie Barrington, The Metaphor of the Miner’s Canary and Black-White Disparities in
Health: A Review of Intergenerational Socioeconomic Factors and Perinatal Outcomes, in SOCIAL
INEQUALITY AND PUBLIC HEALTH 83, 83 (Salvatore J. Babobes ed., 2009).
11. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, INFANT MORTALITY, http://www.cdc.gov/
reproductivehealth/maternalinfanthealth/infantmortality.htm.
12. See Barrington, supra note 10, at 84.
13. See id. at 84–85.
14. See NAT’L CTR. FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, HEALTH, UNITED STATES, 2011: WITH SPECIAL
FEATURE ON SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS AND HEALTH 46 (2012), http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/hus/
hus11.pdf.
15. Mary Carmichael, Why Racial Disparities in Health Care Persist, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 14, 2010,
http://www.newsweek.com/why-racial-disparities-health-care-persist-75409.
16. See UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH
CARE (Brian D. Smedley et al. eds., 2003).
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17

toward health-care providers. More recent studies suggest that stress from
discrimination, and the perception thereof, can also have a harmful effect on
18
perinatal outcomes. Time and generations compound these factors. That is, the
longer a female lives in economically and psychologically stressful conditions,
19
the more likely she will bear children with perinatal health problems; in fact,
the conditions under which a woman lives can adversely impact the health of
20
not one but two generations. For example, if a woman, due to life
circumstances, bears an undernourished child with low birth weight, that child is
21
more likely as an adult to bear an underweight child.
On a positive note, research into racial disparities in infant mortality has
helped to identify conditions that cause infant mortality generally, which has
helped to bring infant mortality rates down for all women. At the same time,
however, the racial gap—the ratio of black to white rates of infant mortality—
has increased, prompting some experts to describe racial disparities in infant
22
mortality as a persistent “puzzle” and “mystery.” Despite uncertainty
regarding underlying causes, broad consensus prevails that racial disparities in
23
infant mortality is a concern warranting government attention.
Such attention, however, may well be unconstitutional according to
24
Supreme Court interpretation. Equal protection doctrine increasingly
demands that government institutions be “colorblind”; that is, give no effect to
25
race in governmental decisionmaking. Thus, it has been suggested that state
action intended to benefit racial minorities arguably constitutes “suspect” racial
17. Katrina Armstrong et al., Racial/Ethnic Differences in Physician Distrust in the United States, 97
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1283 (2007); see also Barbara A. Noah, A Prescription for Racial Equality in
Medicine, 40 CONN. L. REV. 675, 677–78 (2008) (stating that cultural barriers between doctors and
minority patients contributes to the disparity in the quality of care).
18. Tyan Parker Dominguez et al., Racial Differences in Birth Outcomes: The Role of General,
Pregnancy, and Racism Stress, 27 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 194 (2008).
19. Barrington, supra note 10, at 86.
20. See id. at 88 (citing studies that found a grandmother’s educational attainment was linked to
preterm births for the next two generation of women).
21. Id. at 86.
22. See Braveman, supra note 7; Kashef, supra note 8 (describing infant mortality rate disparities as
“persistent peril” and “medical mystery”); Timothy Williams, Tackling Infant Mortality Rates Among
Blacks, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2011 (describing infant mortality disparities as a “mystery that has eluded
researchers”).
23. See CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, CDC GRAND ROUNDS: PUBLIC HEALTH
APPROACHES TO REDUCING U.S. INFANT MORTALITY, WEEKLY, (Aug. 9, 2013), http://www.cdc.
gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6231a3.htm (describing state, local and national efforts to reduce
infant mortality and racial disparities in infant mortality, including programs, funded by Congress
through the CDC of forty-three states and New York City); Fern R. Huack, Kawai O. Tanabe &
Rachel Y. Moon, Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Infant Mortality, 35 SEMINARS IN PERINATOLOGY
209, 209 (2013).
24. This article’s discussion over whether certain state actions are constitutional or not is limited to
the application of equal protection doctrine as developed by the Supreme Court. The article does not
intend to endorse or accept Supreme Court doctrine as a proper interpretation of the Constitution.
25. See Kim Forde-Mazrui, The Constitutional Implications of Race-Neutral Affirmative Action, 88
GEO. L.J. 31, 37–51 (2000); Helen Norton, The Supreme Court's Post-Racial Turn Towards a Zero-Sum
Understanding of Equality, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 197 (2010).
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discrimination subject to strict scrutiny even when implemented through race26
neutral means. Scholars continue to debate variations and implications of that
27
28
claim, and constitutional doctrine continues in the direction of colorblindness.
This article follows the logic of the colorblindness trend further. It asks
whether, for equal protection purposes, a state necessarily discriminates by race
when it investigates a racial disparity, identifies its root causes, and addresses
those causes without regard to race in purpose or means. Prior scholarship has
29
considered a related, but different question. The prior question was whether
state action that is intended to benefit racial minorities through race-neutral
30
means is racially discriminatory. The current question is whether state action
that is intended to benefit people regardless of race through race-neutral means
is racially discriminatory if the state’s decision resulted in any part from a prior
investigation into the causes of a racial disparity.
To illustrate, consider again disparities in infant mortality. Assume that a
state’s investigation into such disparities reveals that black people
disproportionately lack access to prenatal care. Three remedial responses
suggest themselves, each illustrating a different role for racial motivation. First,
a state could subsidize prenatal care for low-income black women in order to
reduce the racial gap in infant mortality. Second, a state could subsidize
prenatal care for low-income women of any race in order to reduce the racial
gap in infant mortality. Third, a state could subsidize prenatal care for lowincome women of any race in order to reduce infant mortality, period.
The first option would be subject to strict scrutiny because it employs a
racial classification—black women—as means. The second option would
31
arguably be subject to strict scrutiny pursuant to prior scholarship in the area
because, though it employs race-neutral means, it is arguably motivated by a
racially discriminatory purpose: reducing a racial gap. The third option, which is
the concern of this article, might also be subject to strict scrutiny even though it
employs race-neutral means—low-income women—and pursues a race-neutral
purpose—reducing infant mortality generally. The basis for applying strict
scrutiny to this third option is that a racial motivation—to investigate the racial

26. See id. at 95.
27. See, e.g., Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Strict Scrutiny of Facially Race-Neutral State Action and the Texas
Ten Percent Plan, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 289 (2001); Alan Wendler Hersh, Keep It Quiet: How Facially
Neutral Affirmative Action Passes Constitutional Scrutiny, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1885 (2011); George La
Noue & Kenneth L. Marcus, “Serious Consideration” of Race-Neutral Alternatives in Higher Education,
57 CATH. U.L. REV. 991 (2008); Norton, supra note 25; Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Constitutional
Future of Race-Neutral Efforts to Achieve Diversity and Avoid Racial Isolation in Elementary and
Secondary Schools, 50 B.C. L. REV. 277 (2009).
28. See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 25, at 37–51; Michelle Adams, Is Integration a Discriminatory
Purpose?, 96 IOWA L. REV. 837 (2011); Richard A. Primus, Equal Protection and Disparate Impact:
Round Three, 117 HARV. L. REV. 494, 519 n.111 (2003) (citing GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 1, at
11–12).
29. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 25.
30. Id. at 34–35.
31. Id.
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gap in infant mortality—played a causal role in bringing about the ultimate
policy. In that sense, the policy to reduce infant mortality was because of, not
32
merely in spite of, race. If the state must be race indifferent in its motivations,
then a state’s pursuit of nonracial goals through nonracial means might still
constitute racial discrimination if attention to a racial disparity motivated the
investigative process that produced the ultimate policy.
Examining whether investigating racial disparities constitutionally taints any
use of the information gained therefrom is important for at least two reasons.
First, it might reveal that a significant amount of contemporary state action is
unconstitutional. Every state and the federal government investigates racial
33
disparities in an attempt to understand and address their root causes. Health
disparities alone require a significant investment of government attention and
34
resources. According to the Center for Disease Control and Prevention, stark
racial disparities persist across a wide range of health conditions, such as cancer,
35
heart disease, diabetes, and HIV–AIDS. The racial gap in health, moreover,
which has been documented for several decades, is an issue that has consistently
36
raised concerns and calls for action from both political parties. Beyond health,
37
38
39
40
racial disparities in education, employment, wealth, marriage rates and
41
42
43
44
nonmarital births, juvenile delinquency and punishment, crime commission
32. See Pers. Adm’r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979) (explaining that a discriminatory
purpose is one by which the legislature adopts a policy because of, not merely in spite of, its adverse
impact on a racial group).
33. See infra text accompanying notes 37–48.
34. See, e.g., Healthy People 2020, HEALTHYPEOPLE.GOV, www.healthypeople.gov/2020/AboutHealthy-People.
35. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, CDC HEALTH DISPARITIES & INEQUALITIES
REPORT 1 (Nov. 22, 2013), http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/pdf/other/su6203.pdf.
36. Cf. Healthy People 2020, supra note 34 (suggesting a broad group of individuals and
organizations support eliminating disparities in health outcomes); 2014 Health Disparities Legislation
NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES (July 11, 2014), http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/2014-healthdisparities-legislation.aspx (listing proposed legislation from more than thirty states aimed at solving
the health-disparities problem).
37. Ethnic and Racial Disparities in Education: Psychology’s Contributions to Understanding and
Reducing Disparities, AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N, http://www.apa.org/ed/resources/racial-disparities.aspx
(last visited Nov. 12, 2015).
38. Drew Desilver, Black Unemployment Rate is Consistently Twice that of Whites, PEW RES. CTR.
(Aug. 21, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/08/21/through-good-times-and-bad-blackunemployment-is-consistently-double-that-of-whites/.
39. Rakesh Kochhar & Richard Fry, Wealthy Inequality has Widened Along Racial, Ethnic Lines
Since End of Great Recession, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2014/12/12/racial-wealth-gaps-great-recession/.
40. R. Kelly Raley, Megan M. Sweeney & Daneille Wondra, The Growing Racial and Ethnic
Divide in U.S. Marriage Patterns, FUTURE CHILD. 89, 89 (Fall 2015).
41. CARMEN SOLOMON-FEARS, CONG. RES. SERV., NONMARITAL BIRTHS: AN OVERVIEW (July
30, 2014), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43667.pdf.
42. NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, DISPROPORTIONATE MINORITY CONTACT,
http://www.ncsl.org/documents/cj/jjguidebook-dmc.pdf.
43. AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, Racial Disparities in Sentencing (Oct. 27, 2014), https://www.aclu.
org/sites/default/files/assets/141027_iachr_racial_disparities_aclu_submission_0.pdf.
44. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, REPORT OF THE SENTENCING PROJECT TO THE UNITED
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48

and victimization, arrest, conviction, and sentencing, among others, are the
subject of investigation by social scientists, policymakers, and organizations
affiliated with the federal government, as well as every state government,
regardless of which political party is in power. Even the government’s role in
simply compiling data on racial disparities may be problematic to the extent it
encourages policymakers, public and private, to rely on that information in
designing remedial policies. Indeed, the collection of racial data by itself,
including by the Census Bureau, arguably constitutes the unlawful use of racial
49
classifications inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause. If colorblindness
is a constitutional imperative, then government cannot gather racial
information about its citizens or respond to racial disparities because it cannot
“see” race. A truly colorblind Constitution would require the government to
ignore the canary in the mine.
Second, inquiry into this constitutional question may reveal that the
relationship between race-consciousness and equal protection is more
complicated than a literal understanding of colorblind constitutionalism admits.
Equal protection doctrine tends to keep with the tide of prevailing societal
50
views. Societal consensus that government ought generally to be colorblind
exists alongside substantial consensus that government may, and arguably
should, investigate and ameliorate the root causes of racial inequality. This
suggests that equal protection doctrine, as currently understood, can
accommodate both propositions. Can it, and if so, how?
The article makes two principal claims about the government’s authority to
investigate and address the causes of racial disparities. First, a plausible
interpretation of contemporary equal protection doctrine would subject to strict
scrutiny and probably invalidate any state-sponsored attempts to reduce racial
disparities. Second, and alternatively, a better interpretation of current doctrine
could permit a state to act in response to racial disparities without
discriminating by race, provided that the racial motivation is limited to
investigating the causes of the disparities.

NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE: REGARDING RACIAL DISPARITIES IN THE UNITED STATES
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (Aug. 2013), http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rd_ICCPR%20
Race%20and%20Justice%20Shadow%20Report.pdf.
45. Mark T. Berg, Accounting for Racial Disparities in the Nature of Violent Victimization, 30 J.
QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 629 (2014).
46. NAT’L ASS’N FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF COLORED PEOPLE, Criminal Justice Fact Sheet,
http://www.naacp.org/pages/criminal-justice-fact-sheet (last accessed Nov. 12, 2015).
47. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, REDUCING RACIAL DISPARITY IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM, http://www.sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/rd_reducingracialdisparity.pdf.
48. Id. at 6.
49. See Morales v. Daley, 116 F. Supp. 2d 801, 812–16 (S.D. Tex. 2000) (entertaining though
rejecting lawsuit claiming the census violates equal protection by inquiring into racial classification).
50. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (2004) (arguing that the Supreme Court rarely deviates from
the weight of societal opinion).
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Developing the first claim, part II follows colorblind constitutionalism
toward its logical end, which would invalidate or at least subject to strict
scrutiny any state action directed toward addressing racial disparities in any
context. The point of this part is neither to endorse nor deride an argument for
complete colorblindness. Rather, the point is to take the colorblind trend of
Supreme Court precedent seriously and demonstrate its implications for
government-sponsored efforts to address the racial disparities that persist across
a broad range of social and economic indicators. Part II.A synthesizes current
equal protection doctrine as applied to racial classifications and other racially
discriminatory state actions, delineating between those racial motivations that
are per se invalid and those that are suspect and thus invalid unless they survive
strict scrutiny. Part II.B applies these principles to the example of racial
disparities in infant mortality, beginning with the most clearly suspect response
to such disparities—reserving prenatal care for minority women—to the least
suspect, awarding such care without any regard to race except in the initial
impetus to investigate the racial disparity. Although the case for subjecting the
latter to strict scrutiny is not irrefutable, it is within the range of plausible
applications of colorblind principles already reflected in equal protection
doctrine.
Part III develops the second claim, namely, that the investigative use of race
need not be constitutionally suspect. Part III.A describes a range of contexts in
which the government’s attention to race is widely considered legitimate
without warranting strict scrutiny. Those contexts include trial adjudication,
legislative fact-finding, and research by government agencies. A common theme
among these presumably legitimate uses of race is that race is taken account of
for investigative, evidentiary, or otherwise informational purposes. Part III.B
advances a positive account of why a state’s investigation of a racial disparity
and its use of the information obtained from the inquiry need not involve an
illegitimate or racially discriminatory purpose. Applied to racial disparities in
infant mortality, the state may legitimately inquire into such disparities, identify
their root causes, and seek to ameliorate those causes on a race-neutral basis
without needing to satisfy strict scrutiny.
The final two subparts of Part III flesh out the argument in two respects.
Part III.C explains two corollaries of the investigative use of race; namely, that
it may have the effect of benefiting white people and harming black and other
people of color. Identifying these corollaries should make clear that the
investigative use of race is not simply a form of affirmative action through raceneutral means. Part III.D considers whether this article’s defense of using race
to investigate racial disparities has implications for more controversial raceconscious state actions, such as disparate-impact liability for employment
practices, electoral districting, police investigations, and state-sponsored efforts
to remedy so-called “societal discrimination.”
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II
TOWARD COLORBLIND CONSTITUTIONALISM
A. Illegitimate and Suspect Uses of Race
Current equal protection doctrine establishes four propositions regarding
the use of race by any state or federal actor, including legislatures, executive
officials, administrative agencies, and courts. First, a law is per se
unconstitutional, whether it employs a racial classification or is race-neutral on
its face, if it is motivated by certain illegitimate racial assumptions, beliefs, or
intentions. Second, any other law that employs a racial classification or which is
administered with a discriminatory purpose is constitutionally suspect and,
accordingly, invalid unless, under strict scrutiny, the government proves the use
of race is narrowly tailored to further a compelling government interest. Third,
this rule of suspectness applies to facially neutral classifications that are adopted
with a purpose to discriminate against a racial minority. Fourth, a facially
neutral law that is adopted with a purpose to discriminate in favor of a racial
minority is arguably suspect, but the point remains unsettled.
At the core of impermissible racial classifications are those that exclude or
segregate black people based on ideologies of white supremacy or racial
animosity. Once the Supreme Court reached this position, most famously in
51
Brown v. Board of Education, it struck down all laws that segregated or
52
excluded black people without subjecting such laws to strict scrutiny. The
Court then moved to invalidate, as per se illegitimate, racial classifications
premised on certain unacceptable stereotypes, overbroad generalizations, or
53
empirically unwarranted assumptions.
The peremptory challenge of
prospective jurors, for example, was initially invalidated only if it reflected a
54
prosecutor’s belief that blacks were unfit for jury service in every case, but in
55
56
Batson v. Kentucky and its progeny, the Court decided that any peremptory
51. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
52. See, e.g., Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350, 354 (1962) (invalidating segregation in
airport restaurants and restrooms); New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass’n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54,
54 (1958) (invalidating segregation in city parks); Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Board of Control, 350 U.S.
413, 413 (1956) (invalidating segregation in public law school); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903, 903
(1956) (invalidating segregation in city buses); Holmes v. Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879, 879 (1955) (invalidating
segregation in city golf course); Mayor & City Council of Balt. City v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877, 877 (1955)
(invalidating segregation in public beaches and bath-houses and swimming pools); Muir v. Louisville
Park Theatrical Ass’n, 347 U.S. 971, 971 (1954) (invalidating segregation in fishing lakes).
53. See e.g., Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (justifying strict scrutiny as a test that “ensures that the means
chosen ‘fit’ this compelling goal so closely that there is little or no possibility that the motive for the
classification was illegitimate racial prejudice or stereotype.” For a discussion on the illegitimate use of
racial stereotype, see Forde-Mazrui, supra note 25, at 55.
54. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 221–24 (1965).
55. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
56. See, e.g., Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 272 (2005) (holding that a prosecutor’s preemptory
challenges based on racial stereotypes could be appealed, even though he provided race-neutral
explanations, because the weight of other evidence could suggest the prosecutor had a racial bias);
Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003) (holding that a defendant was entitled to a certificate of
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challenge based on an assumption about a juror’s likely perspective based on
race was illegitimate because such an assumption is irrational and reflects the
57
“very stereotype the law condemns.” A similar view of stereotypes has also
informed the Court’s skepticism toward drawing electoral districts based on
race, describing the practice as reflecting the stereotype that people of a certain
race “think alike, share the same political interests, and will prefer the same
58
candidates at the polls.” Another illegitimate motivation is what the Court has
59
called “simple racial politics.” By this, the Court seems to envision some sort
of motivation to pass laws for the benefit of one’s own racial group simply
60
because the group has gained sufficient political power. Finally, the Court has
repeatedly condemned, as per se unconstitutional, “racial balancing”—the
61
pursuit of proportional racial representation for its own sake. Thus, if evidence
demonstrates that a racial classification or other racially motivated state action
is based on an illegitimate assumption or belief, racial politics, or a purpose to
achieve racial balance, then the state action is unconstitutional per se, without
subjecting the state action to strict scrutiny analysis.
Two kinds of racially motivated state actions are suspect regardless of which
race is benefited or burdened by the action. The first are all racial classifications
(other than those described above that are invalid per se). A racial classification
refers to a law that expressly includes race as an element such that the
government is required or authorized to take account of race in administering
62
the law. Despite disagreement on the Court for over a decade about whether
racial classifications intended to benefit minorities should be subject to the
same strict scrutiny as classifications designed to harm minorities, the Court
63
decided in Richmond v. Croson to treat both classifications the same,
explaining that “the standard of review under the Equal Protection Clause is
not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular
64
classification.” A second kind of state action that is subject to strict scrutiny
appeal because the evidence could support a claim that the prosecution’s exclusion on venire were
racially motivated, which would violate the Equal Protection Clause); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S.
42, 59 (1992) (holding that defendants cannot exclude jurors on the basis of race or racial stereotypes);
Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 630–31(1991) (holding that excluding jurors on the
basis of racial stereotypes in civil cases violated the Equal Protection Clause); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S.
400, 415 (1991) (holding that defendant has the right to bring a third-party equal protection claim on
the behalf of jurors excluded on the basis of their race, even if the defendant and the juror are of a
different race).
57. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 410 (1991).
58. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993).
59. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989).
60. Id. at 495–96.
61. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 729–30 (2007) (citing
Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978)); see also Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306,
330 (2003).
62. See Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 269–79 (1978) (classifying an admissions
program that took into account an applicant’s race as having a racial classification).
63. 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
64. Id. at 494; see also Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995) (applying same
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regardless of which race is benefited or burdened is when a state discriminates
65
by race in administering a law even if the law is race neutral on its face.
Also suspect is a law that is race-neutral on its face and is administered
without regard to race, but which is adopted for the purpose of discriminating
against a racial minority. For example, if, for the purpose of reducing access by
racial minorities to institutions, a government employer adopts a job
66
67
qualification, a public university implements an admission standard, or a state
68
enacts a voting requirement, including the shape of an electoral district, such
state action is presumptively unconstitutional.
Some uncertainty surrounds the constitutional implications of a law that is
race-neutral in content and operation, but that was adopted for the purpose of
benefiting minorities. The Supreme Court has analyzed the use of race-neutral
means only for the purpose of benefiting minorities in the context of electoral
districting. The Court subjected a majority-minority district to strict scrutiny in
Shaw v. Reno, seemingly treating such districts as equally suspect as those
69
70
drawn for the benefit of whites. In Miller v. Johnson, however, the Court
announced a unique test for when a majority-minority district is suspect. The
Court held that an electoral district drawn for the benefit of a racial minority is
71
only suspect if race played a predominant role in shaping the district. If,
however, race is merely one among other factors of equal or greater influence,
72
then a majority-minority district will not be evaluated under strict scrutiny. In
contrast, the Court will employ strict scrutiny whenever a state uses race-neutral
means to burden a racial minority, including in drawing an electoral district,
73
even when race was merely one among many factors.
With respect to other contexts in which race-neutral means might be used to
benefit racial minorities, the Court has not addressed the issue, but some
justices have suggested in dicta that such policies would not be suspect. For
74
example, in Parents Involved in Community Schools, Justice Kennedy
indicated that he would join the Court’s four more-liberal justices to permit,
rule to federal government).
65. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) (stating that
judicial deference is not justified for race-neutral laws that exhibit a clear pattern of discrimination as
applied).
66. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976) (assuming that, if police department adopted test
in order to discriminate against black applicants, it would be subject to strict scrutiny, but concluding
that such a purpose had not been proved).
67. United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 739–40 (1992).
68. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 348–49 (1960).
69. 509 U.S. 630, 653 (1993).
70. 515 U.S. 900 (1995).
71. Id. at 916.
72. Id.
73. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977) (explaining
in context of allegation of racial discrimination against blacks that a finding of an invidious
discriminatory purpose as one “motivating factor” is sufficient to as trigger strict scrutiny); Gomillion,
364 U.S. at 347 (invalidating racial gerrymandering designed to disenfranchise blacks).
74. 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
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without strict scrutiny, the use of race-neutral policies to create racially
75
integrated schools. And in the context of government construction contracts in
the late 1980s, a plurality of justices, including Justice Scalia, suggested that the
use of race-neutral criteria to increase the number of contracts awarded to
76
minority-owned firms would not be suspect.
A more recent case suggests, in contrast, that the Court would treat raceneutral policies designed to benefit racial minorities as equally suspect to
policies designed to harm minorities. In Ricci v. DeStefano, the Court held that
a city’s discarding of test results for firefighter promotions because the results
would disparately promote whites, constituted discrimination against the white
77
applicants in violation of Title VII. The city’s actions were arguably raceneutral in that they did not involve selecting particular black firefighters for
promotion based on their race, but rather would presumably have involved
redesigning the test and allowing all applicants for promotion to retake it.
Although the Court ruled that discarding the test results was discriminatory
under a statute, it is difficult to see why the Court would not also find it
78
discriminatory under the Constitution. The Court intimated as much, and
79
Justice Scalia reinforced the sentiment emphatically.
Despite the uncertainty over race-neutral policies designed to benefit racial
minorities, the logic of current doctrine firmly supports subjecting such policies
80
to strict scrutiny. The Court has held that strict scrutiny applies to all racial
classifications regardless of which race is burdened or benefited because, the
Court insists, all racial distinctions are inherently suspect, even those designed
81
to benefit minorities for ostensibly benign purposes. The Court has also held,
in earlier cases, that adopting a race-neutral policy with a discriminatory
82
purpose is as suspect as an express racial classification. Although it is true that
those cases involved race-neutral policies designed to harm a racial minority, the
75. See id. at 789 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (suggesting that school districts could engage in efforts
to create racially integrated schools, such as site location and district boundaries that did not involve
individually classifying schoolchildren by race without being subject to strict scrutiny).
76. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509–10 (1989); id. at 526, 528 (Scalia, J.,
concurring in the judgment); see also Forde-Mazrui, supra note 25, at 49–50 (quoting both the plurality
opinion and Justice Scalia’s opinion).
77. 557 U.S. 557, 563.
78. See id. at 576–77 (explaining that Court did not need to address potential equal protection
claim because city’s actions violated statute).
79. Id. at 594 (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that disparate-impact liability encouraged racially
discriminatory employment policies in tension with equal protection doctrine).
80. Forde-Mazrui, supra note 25, at 46–49 (arguing that logic of equal protection doctrine supports
subjecting race-neutral laws intended to benefit racial minorities to strict scrutiny).
81. Croson, 488 U.S. at 493 (majority opinion) (explaining that all racial classifications must be
subject to strict scrutiny to “smoke out” illegitimate purposes).
82. See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S 252, 265–66 (1977)
(explaining in the context of allegations of discrimination against blacks that race as one motivating
factor triggers strict scrutiny); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (assuming that proof of
racial motivation behind race-neutral test with a discriminatory impact would trigger strict scrutiny, but
holding that strict scrutiny was not triggered because the test was not motivated by a discriminatory
purpose).
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Court’s insistence that express racial classifications to benefit minorities are
equally suspect strongly suggests that the justices would view race-neutral
policies to benefit minorities with similar skepticism.
B. Colorblind Implications of Current Doctrine
Returning to disparities in infant mortality, the question is whether
governmental investigation of such disparities renders suspect any resulting
action directed at the causes of the disparities. Assume a state investigates the
cause of racial disparities in infant mortality, discovers that blacks are less likely
to receive prenatal care, and further determines that prenatal care reduces
infant mortality. May the state pass legislation that provides prenatal care on a
race-neutral basis? What if, by the time the legislation is adopted, lawmakers
have no racial purpose behind their goal of reducing infant mortality?
Current doctrine could be interpreted to preclude such action or at least
subject it to strict scrutiny. To see how, consider the following three laws,
beginning with the most constitutionally problematic and concluding with the
investigative use of race at the center of our inquiry.
Potential State Responses to Racial Disparities in Infant Mortality:
1. Prenatal care for black women to reduce the racial gap in infant mortality.
2. Prenatal care for all women to reduce the racial gap in infant mortality.
3. Prenatal care for all women to reduce infant mortality.
The first law above would be subject to strict scrutiny. By expressly
targeting black women for prenatal care, the law employs a racial classification.
Under current doctrine, all racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny.
And strict scrutiny would most likely invalidate the law. Strict scrutiny
requires the government to prove that the law is necessary or narrowly tailored
to achieve a compelling state interest. The two most persuasive defenses of the
law would likely fail. First, the state could claim that reducing infant mortality is
a compelling interest. Surely it is, but the difficulty is that the Court would
likely deny that favoring black women for prenatal care is necessary to reduce
infant mortality. To the contrary, by limiting the benefit to black women, white
women and other women of color would be left unaided.
The second potential defense of the prenatal care law for black women
could be an argument that it compensates for the effects of racial
discrimination. The Court has endorsed remedying racial discrimination as a
compelling interest. Presumably, racial disparities in infant mortality reflect at
least to some degree the consequences of historical and contemporary
discrimination against black people. Allocating prenatal care to black women
plausibly makes up for the detrimental conditions that black people have
experienced as a result of discrimination that contributes to infant mortality.
The problem here is that, although the Court recognizes remedying racial
discrimination as a compelling interest, it requires that the discrimination be
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83

identified “with particularity.” It is not enough to cite generalized statistical
disparities—even if they plausibly result from historic discrimination, or what
84
the Court calls “societal discrimination.” The state would need to identify, as
much as practicable, the instances and perpetrators of discrimination and how
that discrimination has contributed to black infant mortality. Such
discrimination, however pervasive and intergenerational, is largely
undocumented. It cannot be identified with the particularity required to satisfy
strict scrutiny.
The second law, prenatal care for all women to reduce the racial gap in
infant mortality, would arguably also be subject to strict scrutiny. The law is
race-neutral on its face, but it is adopted with a discriminatory purpose—to
benefit black women. Strict scrutiny applies to race-neutral policies if they are
adopted with a purpose to discriminate against a racial minority and, as
explained previously, such scrutiny logically applies to policies designed to
benefit minorities. Intending to reduce the racial gap in infant mortality
necessarily intends to benefit black women more than white women. To
appreciate this point, consider if the goal were to increase the racial gap. That
would most likely be viewed as discriminatory. The formal symmetry of the
Court’s equal protection doctrine suggests that it would view reducing the gap
as equally discriminatory for the purpose of triggering strict scrutiny.
Whether this law would survive strict scrutiny is less clear than the previous
law that employs an express racial classification. Laws that employ race-neutral
means are considered more tailored under strict scrutiny than laws that employ
racial classifications. The problems with the prior law, however, plague this one
as well. For reasons similar to those concerning the first law listed above, the
Court would likely conclude that purposely favoring black women is neither
justified by a compelling interest nor necessary to achieve any such interest.
Finally, consider the third law listed above—prenatal care for all women to
reduce infant mortality. This law is race-neutral on its face, administered
without regard to race, and, at the time it was adopted, the state had no purpose
to discriminate by race. At first glance, it is constitutionally unassailable. Recall,
however, that a racial motivation played a causal role earlier in the legislative
process, namely, the state’s concern over the racial disparity in infant mortality
motivated it to investigate potential causes, which led the state both to identify
lack of prenatal care as contributing to infant mortality and to provide prenatal
care to all women as a remedy. The question is whether that earlier racial
motivation constitutes a discriminatory purpose attributable to the prenatal
care law.

83. Croson, 488 U.S. at 492 (explaining that, to remedy past discrimination, the discrimination must
be identified with particularity).
84. Id. at 501 (holding that remedying “societal discrimination” evidenced by generalized statistical
disparities is not sufficiently compelling to justify racial quota but rather discrimination must be
identified with adequate particularity).
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Whether this law involves a discriminatory purpose is debatable, an issue
taken up in the next part at greater length. There is, however, a plausible
argument that it does. To the extent the Court would view an intention to
reduce racial disparities as a discriminatory purpose, then investigating racial
disparities in order to address their underlying causes plausibly also qualifies as
pursuing a discriminatory purpose. Consider, for example, the federal
government’s policy that calls for “work[ing] with communities to reduce and
eliminate health disparities between non-minority and minority populations
experiencing disproportionate burdens of disease, disability, and premature
85
death.” If the government’s investigation into racial disparities is motivated, in
any part, by the goal of reducing them, then such a purpose is plausibly
characterized as a discriminatory purpose.
If the racial motivation behind investigating the racial disparity in infant
mortality were a discriminatory purpose, there would still be the question of
whether it would be legally attributable to the adoption of the prenatal care law
if, as this hypothetical assumes, the legislators voting for the prenatal care law
do not have a racial purpose. Does the fact that the racial purpose dropped out
of the legislative process by the time the law was adopted preclude the law from
being racially discriminatory?
The passage of time between the racial purpose and the law’s adoption
would not necessarily save this law. The Court has made it clear in striking
down race-neutral laws adopted for discriminatory purposes that the time
elapsed since the law was adopted does not necessarily support its
constitutionality. In Hunter v. Underwood, for example, the Court invalidated
an almost century-old Alabama constitutional provision that disenfranchised
persons convicted of crimes of moral turpitude on the ground that the
86
provision’s original purpose was to disenfranchise blacks. The Court rejected
the state’s argument that it had since retained the disenfranchising provision for
legitimate purposes, stating that “we simply observe that its original enactment
was motivated by a desire to discriminate against blacks on account of race and
87
the section continues to this day to have that effect.”
In defense of the prenatal care law, the law in Hunter was adopted with a
discriminatory purpose. With the prenatal care law, in contrast, the state no
longer had a racial purpose by the time the law was adopted. This distinction is
relevant but not dispositive. The Court appears to analyze purposes that are
88
attenuated from the laws they affect as a question of proximate causation. If a
discriminatory purpose proximately causes a law’s adoption or other state
action, then that action will likely be treated as based on the discriminatory
85. OFFICE OF MINORITY HEALTH & HEALTH DISPARITIES, Guiding Principle, http://www.cdc
.gov/omhd/about/disparities.htm.
86. 471 U.S. 222, 233 (1985).
87. Id. (emphasis added).
88. See Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 562 U.S. 411, 416–22 (2011) (explaining that termination is
discriminatory if earlier evaluation that was discriminatory had a reasonably foreseeable effect on the
ultimate termination decision).
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purpose. A recent case involving interpretation of a law against employment
89
discrimination reflects this analysis. In Staub v. Proctor Hospital, the Court
held that a discriminatory purpose by a supervisor, carried out through negative
evaluations of an employee, and which proximately caused a later supervisor to
terminate the employee, made the termination discriminatory even though the
terminating supervisor did not know of the discriminatory purpose behind the
90
negative evaluations. Hunter also supports this analysis. There, the Court
treated as irrelevant the state’s claim that it had retained the disenfranchising
law for nonracial reasons, suggesting that the retention, even if race-neutral in
purpose, was tainted by its causal relationship to the discriminatory purpose
91
behind the law’s original enactment.
Staub and Hunter indicate that if the state acts with a racially discriminatory
purpose, and that action proximately causes the state’s later adoption of a law,
then that law can be considered based on the discriminatory purpose—even if
the state did not act with such a purpose at the time the law is adopted. Thus,
with the prenatal care law, if the motivation originating the investigation into
the racial disparity was a discriminatory purpose, and if that investigation
proximately caused the adoption of the law, then the law may be considered
based on a discriminatory purpose even though the lawmakers adopting the law
were not motivated by that purpose.
Under strict scrutiny, the law would probably be invalidated. Although
reducing infant mortality is probably compelling, the goal of reducing the racial
gap in infant mortality is probably not. The gap is plausibly caused by past
discrimination that has caused black people to live in more “toxic”
socioeconomic circumstances than whites. But the difficulty, again, is that to
constitute a compelling interest, the past discrimination being remedied must be
92
identified “with particularity.” Unless the state can trace the racial gap in
infant mortality to identified discrimination, the Court would likely characterize
the past discrimination at issue as “societal discrimination,” the remedying of
93
which the Court has rejected under strict scrutiny. Indeed, the Court may well
view the desire to reduce the racial gap as “racial balancing,” a per se
94
unconstitutional goal. Thus, any attempt to remedy the racial gap in infant
mortality would be vulnerable to invalidation. Whatever social and economic
toxins cause the disproportionate rate at which black infants die are
89. Id.
90. Id. at 416–22 (explaining that termination is discriminatory if earlier evaluation that was
discriminatory had a reasonably foreseeable effect on the ultimate termination decision).
91. See Hunter, 471 U.S. at 231–33 (holding unconstitutional disenfranchising provision of state
constitution that was motivated by a discriminatory purpose when adopted despite claim by state that it
has since retained the provision for nondiscriminatory reasons).
92. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 492 (1989) (explaining that, to remedy past
discrimination, the discrimination must be identified with particularity).
93. See id. at 505–06 (rejecting the remedying of societal discrimination as compelling).
94. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 730 (2007)
(explaining that using race to achieve proportionate representation of schoolchildren of different races
constitutes “racial balancing,” a per se unconstitutional purpose).
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presumptively off-limits to government attention. The canary’s distress must be
ignored.
The foregoing analysis represents a logical extension of current equal
protection doctrine’s conceptualization of what constitutes a racially
discriminatory purpose. The Court need not go so far, and the fact that many
government institutions presume authority to reduce racial disparities suggests
that the Court may identify a basis for upholding such policies. One approach
the Court could take is to subject policies that address racial disparities through
race-neutral means to strict scrutiny, but to uphold them if justified on grounds
95
of remedying societal discrimination. Alternatively, equal protection doctrine
could be interpreted to permit government to investigate and address the root
causes of racial disparities without having to satisfy strict scrutiny. Let us turn to
that interpretation.
III
THE INVESTIGATIVE USE OF RACE
This part argues that a state can investigate the causes of racial disparities
and address those causes without triggering strict scrutiny. Supreme Court
precedent, read carefully, does not subject all racially motivated state action to
strict scrutiny. Rather, strict scrutiny applies only if a challenger proves that a
law employs a racial classification or that the law, if race-neutral, is adopted or
administered with a discriminatory purpose. A discriminatory purpose requires
that the state intends the law to have an adverse or beneficial effect on a racial
group. The investigative use of race does not, without more, include a
discriminatory purpose. Rather, it involves investigating racial disparities for
the purpose of gaining information and, if the information is worth addressing
for nonracial reasons, using the information without a racially discriminatory
purpose.
To lay the groundwork for distinguishing investigative from discriminatory
uses of race, part III.A describes various contexts in which governmental
decisionmaking takes account of race without attracting demands, including by
courts, that such decisionmaking be subject to strict scrutiny. If societal and
judicial tolerance of the racially motivated state actions described below is
consistent with current doctrine, then such actions, at least ostensibly, are not
discriminatory. Part III.B develops the argument as to why they are not.
A. Apparently Nondiscriminatory Uses of Race
Race is routinely used by the government in a variety of contexts for
investigative, evidentiary, or otherwise informational purposes without being
subject to strict scrutiny. Such contexts include trial adjudication, legislative
fact-finding, and government agency research. In the adjudicative process, trial
95. See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 25, at 51–81 (arguing that strict scrutiny should permit raceneutral policies designed to remedy societal racial discrimination).
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courts frequently take race into account in ways that affect trial outcomes
without the influence of race on the decision-making process being considered
discriminatory or suspect. Perhaps the least controversial use of race is as
evidence in adjudicating claims of intentional, racial discrimination. In such
cases, the race of the party claiming to have been discriminated against, the race
of the alleged discriminator, and often the race of third parties, such as other
employees or applicants, is admitted as evidence for and against an inference of
96
discrimination on the part of the defendant. In such cases, race is not only
accepted without being subject to strict scrutiny, it is sometimes required as part
97
of the elements of a party’s claim or defense. This is especially evident in the
adjudication of systemic or “pattern or practice” claims. Whether brought by
the government or as a class action, such claims effectively require the plaintiff
98
to present statistical evidence of racial disparities to prove her claim. The
defendant is also permitted, and effectively encouraged, to present her own
racial statistics—ones that tend to counter an inference that the defendant
99
engaged in discrimination.
Discrimination cases challenging affirmative action policies also involve
evidentiary uses of race. For example, Abigail Fisher recently sued the
University of Texas and part of her evidence was racial. She pointed to the use
of race in the University of Texas’s admission policy and, furthermore, she
emphasized the number of blacks and Latinos that are admitted by the
university’s alternative top-ten-percent policy. She also introduced the fact that
100
she is white. The Court has never suggested that the introduction of such
racial information should be subjected to strict scrutiny notwithstanding the fact
that the plaintiff provided that racial information to facilitate adjudication of
101
her claim.
Likewise, in disparate-impact claims under Title VII, the plaintiff must
present evidence that an employer’s hiring policy results in a significant racial
disparity in order to shift the burden to the defendant-employer to show that
the policy is job related. Evidence that a policy has a racial impact may also be
offered by an employer as a defense to a claim of intentional discrimination. In
Ricci, for example, the Court held that the city would need a strong basis in
evidence that it would have faced disparate-impact liability if it had used the
96. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (2009); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502
(1993); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
97. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973) (establishing elements of
plaintiff’s prima facie case, which includes that defendant “belongs to a racial minority”); St. Mary’s
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993) (noting District Court’s finding that plaintiff had satisfied
minimal requirements of prima facie case by proving, among other elements, that he is black).
98. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S. 324, 339 (1977).
99. Id. at 340; see also Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. U.S., 433 U.S. 299, 309–13 (1977).
100. Second Amended Complaint for Declaratory, Injunctive, and Other Relief at 3, Fisher v. Univ.
of Tex., 645 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Tex. 2008) (No. 1:08-cv-00263-SS).
101. For the Court’s ultimate decision in this litigation, see generally Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at
Austin, No. 14-981 (June 23, 2016) (affirming on equal protection grounds the Fifth Circuit’s finding
that the University of Texas at Austin’s undergraduate admissions program is constitutional).
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discarded test results in order to defend against the claim of intentional
102
discrimination by the applicants who scored well on the test. Presumably, the
strong basis in evidence would include documentation regarding the test’s
racially disparate impact as well as its tenuous connection to job-related skills.
Thus, far from being suspect, the presentation of racial data is required in
persuading a court to dismiss a discrimination claim brought by disappointed
applicants who scored well on a discarded test.
Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Ricci is also noteworthy. Scalia was one of
the staunchest proponents of colorblind constitutionalism on the Court and his
concurrence in Ricci suggested that disparate-impact liability may violate equal
protection doctrine by encouraging employers to alter hiring policies with a
103
“racial thumb on the scale[].” Yet, in the same opinion, Scalia endorsed the
use of racial statistics for investigative purposes. He acknowledged that the
racially disparate impact of an employer’s policies could be used as an
“evidentiary tool” in determining whether the employer acted with
discriminatory intent. His objection was to using the racial impact of the test to
establish employer liability rather than merely to support a rebuttable inference
of discrimination.
Even in cases that do not involve allegations of racial discrimination, race
has been admitted in the adjudicative process without any suggestion by any
court that its use is suspect. For example, a crime victim, witness, or police
officer may testify that a defendant resembles the observed perpetrator of the
104
charged crime and may rely on race as a factor in explaining the resemblance.
Racial evidence has also been admitted to prove other facts, such as, in a
105
paternity suit, whether a man is in fact the biological father of a child. The
attention to race in these cases is permitted to have a causal influence on a
court’s ultimate decision and yet neither the admission of racial evidence nor a
court’s reliance thereon is considered racially discriminatory.
Nor does the Court limit the investigative use of race to the judiciary. The
Court has approved and even encouraged legislatures to use racial data for factfinding purposes without suggesting that such use is subject to strict scrutiny.
Consider affirmative action cases. The Court requires the legislature or other
governmental body to document the compelling interest that purportedly
justifies the preferential policy. If the government’s interest is remedial, that is,
to remedy prior discrimination, the Court requires that such an interest be

102. See DeStefano, 557 U.S. at 563, 584.
103. Id. at 594 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Title VII’s disparate-impact provisions place a racial thumb
on the scales, often requiring employers to evaluate the racial outcomes of their policies, and to make
decisions based on (because of) those racial outcomes.”).
104. See R. Richard Banks, Race-Based Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal Protection Doctrine
and Discourse, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1075, 1077 n.3 (2001).
105. See, e.g., Nolting v. Holt, 215 P. 281 (Kan. 1923); Damien v. J.G., 957 N.Y.S.2d 819 (N.Y. Fam.
Ct. 2012). Such testimony is likely unnecessary today in light of paternity testing but, again, there was
never any suggestion when it has been used that it represented racially discriminatory court
proceedings.
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demonstrated “with particularity,” including by statistics of racial disparities
106
that support an inference of prior discrimination. For example, the Court
upheld a federal race-based construction contract set-aside in Fullilove v.
107
Klutznick because Congress had made legislative findings that documented,
through race-based statistics, evidence of nationwide racial discrimination in the
108
109
construction industry. In Croson, although the Court invalidated the racebased set-aside program, which required a minimum of 30 percent of the
amount spent on each contract to be paid to “Minority Business Enterprises,”
the Court did so because of the racial quota used to award contracts, not
because the city took race into account in documenting the need for the
program. In fact, the Court explained that the set-aside would more likely have
been upheld if the city, when deciding whether to engage in affirmative action,
had relied on more-particularized race-based statistical evidence of
110
discrimination in the local construction industry. Similarly, if a state pursues a
nonremedial interest through affirmative action, such as the educational
benefits of a racially diverse student body, the Court requires race-based
evidence that having a critical mass of minority students produces pedagogical
benefits and that using a racial preference is necessary to achieve those
111
benefits. The Court has never expressed any concern that the use of race to
substantiate the government’s interest is itself discriminatory and subject to
strict scrutiny.
Ricci is also instructive for its support of the legislative use of race during
the information-gathering stage of designing an employment test. By treating
the discarding of test results with a disparate impact against blacks as
112
discriminating against whites, the Court employed a fairly strong colorblind
understanding of discrimination under Title VII. Nonetheless, the Court
seemed to accept, and even endorse, attention to the racial impact of a test
during the test’s design stage prior to its administration.
Title VII does not prohibit an employer from considering, before administering a test
or practice, how to design that test or practice in order to provide a fair opportunity
for all individuals, regardless of their race. . . . We hold only that, under Title VII,
before an employer can engage in intentional discrimination for the asserted purpose
of avoiding or remedying an unintentional disparate impact, the employer must have a
strong basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact liability if it
113
fails to take the race-conscious, discriminatory action.

106. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 492 (1989) (“Richmond . . . can use its
spending powers to remedy private discrimination, if it identifies that discrimination with the
particularity required by the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
107. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
108. Id. at 459.
109. See id.
110. Id. at 492, 509.
111. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
112. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 579 (2009) (stating that discarding test results because too
many white candidates, and not enough black candidates, would be promoted, without more violated
Title VII’s prohibition against making employment decisions on the basis of a person’s race).
113. Id. at 585.
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At two points in the foregoing statement, the Court approves an employer’s
attention to race. First, the Court’s assurance that Title VII does not prohibit an
employer from considering whether a test is fair to individuals regardless of
race must include the employer’s consideration of whether a test has a racially
disparate impact. Otherwise, the statement is trivially true. It goes without
saying that an employer may consider a test’s fairness in nonracial respects.
The Court’s assurance is only meaningful if it is referring to race-based
considerations. Second, the Court’s requirement that an employer have a strong
basis in evidence of potential disparate-impact liability before discarding a test’s
results would presumably include a strong basis in evidence that the discarded
test would have a racially disparate impact. The employer could not be subject
to disparate-impact liability unless the test had a racially disparate impact. Thus,
for an employer to discard a test’s results lawfully, it must take account of race.
Executive agencies also collect, analyze, and use racial data. The most
prominent of such practices is the Census, whose collection of racial
demographic information is largely uncontroversial. Indeed, skeptics of
colorblindness have cited the Census as an example of how absolute
colorblindness is not a plausible interpretation of the Constitution because such
an interpretation would invalidate the data-gathering methodology of the
114
Census.
Beyond merely collecting racial data, countless governmental
institutions, state and federal, as well as private institutions at the behest of
government, routinely collect and analyze racial disparities across a broad range
115
of contexts in an effort to diagnose their causes. Such practices are widely
accepted and, in fact, the government often requires various organizations to
keep track of racial data, such as employers, educational institutions, and
116
medical researchers. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to observe that millions of
hours are spent every year by researchers and policymakers at all levels of
government, including public universities—and in a wide variety of private
organizations, often with government funding—investigating racial disparities
in contexts such as health, family, education, employment, criminal justice, and
virtually all areas of the civic, economic, and social life of the nation. The
114. Andrew M. Carlon, Racial Adjudication, 2007 BYU L. REV. 1151, 1158 (2007) (arguing that
census race classification by itself and with any effect is not problematic as evidenced by jurisprudence
and legislative initiatives).
115. MARY BERNADETTE OTT & GARY YINGLING, GUIDE TO GOOD CLINICAL PRACTICE ¶ 350
(2015); Manav Bhatnagar, Identifying the Identified: The Census, Race, and the Myth of SelfClassification, 13 TEX. J. CIV. LIBERTIES & CIV. RTS. 85, 86 (2007); David A. Harris, The Reality of
Racial Disparity in Criminal Justice: The Significance of Data Collection, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., no.
3, 2003, at 71; Christopher Ogolla, Will the Use of Racial Statistics in Public Health Surveillance Survive
Equal Protection Challenges? A Prolegomenon for the Future, 31 N.C. CENT. L. REV. 1, 2 (2008).
116. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 1602.7 and Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 70 Fed. Reg. 71,
294, at 71, 295 (Nov. 28, 2005) (requiring all employers subject to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 to submit race data on employees via the Employment Information Report (EEO–1); 34 C.F.R. §
303.721 (a) (2001) (requiring state agencies to report statistics on the number of children and toddlers
receiving early interventions services in the state by race) and Final Guidance on Maintaining,
Collecting, and Reporting Racial and Ethnic Data to the U.S. Department of Education 72 Fed. Reg.
59,266, 59,266 (Oct. 19, 2007).
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societal acceptance of such broad-scale activity suggests that the activity is not
racially discriminatory, at least not in the doctrinal sense that would require
satisfying virtually-always-fatal strict scrutiny.
How the courts would analyze such investigative uses of race is difficult to
assess; there has been scant litigation challenging such practices, a fact that itself
suggests their unobjectionable status. The attention to race by the Census,
however, has not gone completely without criticism. One court case, for
117
example, challenged the Census as racially discriminatory, but the court
ultimately upheld the use of race by the Census Bureau on the ground the
118
collection of demographic information is not in and of itself discriminatory.
Supreme Court precedent also supports the collection of racial data and the
use of such data for government decisionmaking. In Tancil v. Woolls, the Court
affirmed a District Court ruling upholding the designation of race in divorce
119
decrees.
The Supreme Court’s opinion was per curiam and lacked
explanation, but the District Court’s opinion that was upheld reasoned that “the
designation of race, just as sex or religious denomination, may in certain records
serve a useful purpose, and the procurement and compilation of such
120
information by State authorities cannot be outlawed per se.” Furthermore, the
District Court explained, “[T]he securing and chronicling of racial data for
121
identification or statistical use violates no constitutional privilege.”
In United States v. Armstrong, the Court cited with approval racial statistics
published by the United States Sentencing Commission and relied on those
122
statistics in deciding the case. Black defendants challenged their prosecution
for crack distribution on the ground that the federal prosecutor allegedly
selected them for prosecution because of race. They introduced evidence in
support of their allegation sufficient to convince the trial court to order
123
discovery from the prosecution. When the prosecution refused to comply, the
124
District Court dismissed the case. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court,
reinstating the prosecution and holding that the defendants had not presented
adequate evidence of similarly situated white crack dealers who were not
125
prosecuted. In concluding that the defendants had failed to demonstrate a
likelihood of racial discrimination, despite evidence that all the defendants
charged by the prosecutor’s office were black, the Court cited the Sentencing
Commission for statistics suggesting that crack distribution was committed
117. See Morales v. Daley, 116 F. Supp. 2d 801 (S.D. Tex. 2000); see also James M. Balkin & Reva
B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927, 937–43 (2006).
118. Morales, 116 F. Supp. 2d at 816.
119. Tancil v. Woolls, 379 U.S. 19 (1964) (per curiam) (affirming sub nom Hamm v. Va. State Bd. of
Elections, 230 F. Supp. 156 (E.D. Va. 1964)).
120. Hamm, 230 F. Supp. at 157.
121. Id. at 158 n.5.
122. 517 U.S. 456 (1996).
123. Id. at 459.
124. Id. at 461.
125. Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 470–71.
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126

disproportionately by blacks. Judicial decisions that discriminate on the basis
127
of race are subject to strict scrutiny, yet the Court did not express any need to
justify its decision to reinstate the prosecution because of race under strict
scrutiny.
Armstrong is interesting for several reasons. First, the Court accepted the
introduction of race-based evidence comparing white and black crack dealers
charged by the federal prosecutor, faulting the defendants for not presenting
more precise and reliable evidence of such. Second, the Court at least implicitly
approved the legitimacy of the Sentencing Commission’s compilation of data
correlating race with crime commission—data that, in turn, incorporated
conviction records containing racial designations. Third, the Court’s reliance on
race in reaching its decision implicitly approves a decision-making process—its
own—that was influenced by attention to race without, presumably,
discriminating on the basis of race.
This section has revealed a range of contexts in which government
decisionmaking, whether by courts, legislatures, or governmental agencies,
takes account of race in the process of determining facts and relies on those
facts in making decisions. The next part develops a doctrinal justification for
why certain race-based decisionmaking need not be subject to strict scrutiny.
B. Investigating Racial Disparities without Discriminating by Race
A state’s investigation into the causes of a racial disparity, and the state’s
use of the information gained from the investigation in addressing those causes,
need not be discriminatory nor subject to strict scrutiny. To most persuasively
test this claim, assume a broad meaning of discriminatory purpose under
current doctrine, namely, the goal of disparately impacting individuals or
groups based on race, even if pursued through race-neutral means and, going
beyond settled doctrine, even if race-neutral means are employed to benefit
racial minorities.
The investigative use of race involves two stages: investigating the causes of
a racial disparity and using the race-neutral information gained for race-neutral
purposes. Regarding the first stage, a state’s investigation into the causes of a
racial disparity would not involve a discriminatory purpose if the state’s
motivation does not include a purpose to reduce the disparity or otherwise to
affect people differently based on their race. If the inquiry’s purpose were only
to understand the causes of the disparity, it would be solely informational. The
intent involved would be one of curiosity and concern, that is, a purpose to
diagnose the cause of the disparity. Such a purpose is distinct, and it need not
imply that the state intends to reduce the disparity.
For this distinction to be sustained, it should be acknowledged that, for the
state’s investigative motivation to count as entirely investigative, and not at all
126. Id. at 469.
127. See, e.g., Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 478 U.S. 421, 479–81 (1986); Palmore v. Sidoti, 466
U.S. 429, 432 (1984).
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discriminatory, it must not include a precommitment to reduce the racial
disparity regardless of what the investigation discovers. If a state’s purpose to
investigate underlying causes of a racial disparity were simply a means for
advancing a purpose to reduce the racial disparity, then the investigation would
arguably be tainted by its accompanying discriminatory purpose.
A second qualification is that the state’s motivation to investigate a disparity
must not be based on an illegitimate assumption or belief. A law motivated by
128
an illegitimate belief or assumption is per se unconstitutional.
If an
illegitimate belief played a substantial role in the state’s investigation, and the
investigation proximately caused the ultimate adoption of the law, then the law
would arguably be unconstitutional per se. Assume, for example, that a state’s
investigation into a racial disparity in which minorities are worse off than whites
is based on the illegitimate assumption that minorities should be worse off
because they are innately inferior. The state expects that whatever is causing
the disparity must be useful and worth reinforcing. Alternatively, assume that
the state’s investigation into the disparity is premised on the illegitimate
assumption that any policy that disproportionately benefits white people, even
unintentionally, is per se objectionable because all white people are unfairly
privileged. Such inquiries, although investigative in nature, would be based on
illegitimate assumptions and would arguably invalidate any use of the
information proximately caused by the investigation.
A colorblindness advocate might object to the prenatal care law to reduce
infant mortality for all women on the ground that, when the state earlier
investigated the racial disparity in infant mortality, it improperly assumed that
racial groups should always be proportionally represented in all contexts. That
assumption may, in turn, reflect either a belief that any disparity is
objectionable in itself or that any disparity must be directly caused by
intentional discrimination. Such beliefs might be characterized, respectively, as
an illegitimate interest in racial balancing or as an unwarranted belief that
direct discrimination is always responsible for any disparity that exists.
Alternatively, one might object that the state’s investigation into a racial
disparity is illegitimate simply because it classifies people by race and gives
effect to race. It violates the proposition, in the words of the first Justice Harlan,
that “our Constitution is color-blind” and does not permit the state to know the
129
race of its citizens. Concern with racial disparities improperly gives relevance
to race in contravention of colorblind constitutionalism’s premise that race is
irrelevant.
Although some concerns over racial disparities would probably not be
legitimate, some are. The Court has not clearly defined what beliefs about race
are illegitimate, but the examples in case law of illegitimate beliefs either
128. See Kim Forde-Mazrui, Tradition as Justification: The Case of Opposite-Sex Marriage, 78 U.
CHI. L. REV. 281, 302 (2011) (explaining that government has no authority to pursue illegitimate
interests or purposes).
129. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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assume a racial group is inferior or posit generalizations about a racial group
130
that are inaccurate, demeaning, or improperly essentializing. A state’s
assumption that racial disparities might, though not necessarily, have an
underlying cause worth addressing need not include a denigrating or
essentializing belief about race.
To the contrary, a concern over racial disparities can be premised on the
irrelevance of race. If race is truly meaningless, then statistically significant
racial disparities suggest that something other than biology or chance is
systematically at work. And, if it is legitimate to suspect that racial disparities
may reflect harmful underlying causes, it should be legitimate to determine
what those causes are. For instance, an investigation might uncover recent
discrimination, conscious or unconscious, which colorblindness advocates
accept as objectionable and worth correcting. Even if discrimination is not the
immediate cause, discrimination may be an indirect cause of some harmful
condition that disproportionately burdens racial minorities. And even if
discrimination is not discernible as a cause at all, a harmful condition that
systematically affects people of one race more than another is worth identifying
in order to help all people who might be affected by that condition. It should
thus be legitimate under such circumstances for a state to inquire into the cause
of a racial disparity to determine if anything untoward is at play.
Assuming that a state’s investigation into a racial disparity is legitimate, the
next question is what, if anything, may the state do with the information gained
from the inquiry? One possibility is that the inquiry identifies racial
discrimination as the immediate cause of the disparity. In such a case,
131
addressing the identified discrimination could satisfy strict scrutiny, so it might
not matter whether or not strict scrutiny is applied. But what if the immediate
cause is something other than discrimination, such as a harmful socioeconomic
condition with unknown preceding causes? May a state, after discovering that
condition, seek to redress it on a race-neutral basis without having to meet the
demands of strict scrutiny?
Ignoring the investigative process that revealed the harmful socioeconomic
condition and assuming that the legislature genuinely wants to address the
condition regardless of its racial effect, then no racial discrimination would
occur. The law would simply involve the use of race-neutral means to address a
race-neutral condition for race-neutral reasons. If the law is to constitute
discrimination, it must be because of its causal relationship to the earlier inquiry
that was motivated by the racial disparity. Even assuming that the state’s prior
investigation proximately caused the legislature to adopt the race-neutral law,
the prior investigation did not include a racially discriminatory purpose. Rather,

130. See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986) (stating that jurors cannot be excluded on
the assumption that their race makes them less qualified).
131. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 492 (1989) (explaining that legislation that
was passed to remedy racial discrimination could survive strict scrutiny if the discrimination could be
identified “with particularity”).
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the state’s purpose was only to diagnose the causes of the disparity, not to
reduce the disparity regardless of its causes. The investigation’s influence on the
law would thus neither be suspect nor subject to strict scrutiny. Nor did the
prior investigation involve an illegitimate assumption and thus its influence on
the law would not per se invalidate the law.
The foregoing analysis could apply to racial disparities in infant mortality.
First, a state may investigate such disparities if its interest is not based on an
illegitimate assumption and if it does not include a racially discriminatory
purpose, such as a precommitment to reduce the racial disparity regardless of
what the investigation reveals. If, for instance, a state is concerned that the
racial disparity in infant mortality might reflect discriminatory treatment by
132
healthcare providers, mistrust on the part of black women inhibiting seeking
133
medical care, or certain harmful socioeconomic conditions disproportionately
134
burdening black women, then the state may investigate the disparity to
determine whether these or other factors are causing it.
Second, the state may take the information gained from the investigation
and decide whether the underlying conditions causing infant mortality warrant
redress regardless of the redress’s racial impact. Assume, for example, that a
state investigates racial disparities in infant mortality and discovers that lack of
access to prenatal care causes infant mortality. If the state decides that prenatal
care should be subsidized for low-income women in order to reduce infant
mortality, it may do so without having to satisfy strict scrutiny, provided the
policy it adopts is genuinely designed to benefit such women without regard to
race and uses race-neutral means.
Beyond the issue of infant mortality, the investigative use of race could
justify a range of other governmental decisionmaking that takes account of race.
The adjudicative processes that relied on race, described in part III.A, may be
understood as taking account of race for investigative, evidentiary, or other
informational purposes. For example, when courts admit evidence of racial
disparities in discrimination claims, the attention to race is to investigate facts in
dispute, such as whether the defendant acted with a discriminatory intent
against the plaintiff. Once that fact is determined, the court’s ultimate judgment
can be based on the facts in dispute rather than the race of the parties or other
actors. In a nondiscrimination case, such as a criminal prosecution for theft, race
may be admitted as part of eyewitness testimony identifying whether the
defendant committed the crime. Once that fact is determined, either way, the
decision to convict or acquit is based on whether the defendant committed the
crime, and not on the defendant’s race. In the context of research into racial
132. See UNEQUAL TREATMENT: CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH
CARE (Brian D. Smedley et al. eds., 2003).
133. Katrina Armstrong et al., Racial/Ethnic Differences in Physician Distrust in the United States, 97
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1283 (2007); see also Barbara A. Noah, A Prescription for Racial Equality in
Medicine, 40 CONN. L. REV. 675, 677–78 (2008) (stating that cultural barriers between doctors and
minority patients contributes to the disparity in the quality of care).
134. See Barrington, supra note 10, at 84.
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disparities by scientists, by policymakers in governmental agencies, or by
private organizations whose research is used by the government, such
investigations need not trigger strict scrutiny if the intentions behind the
investigations, and the government’s use of the knowledge gained from the
research, are both legitimate and nondiscriminatory.
C. Corollaries: Helping Whites and Harming Blacks
Two corollaries of the investigative use of race should help to clarify the
argument, especially for skeptics. Some might suspect that the investigative use
of race is simply a form of “race-neutral” affirmative action—a way to help
racial minorities while avoiding strict constitutional scrutiny. Asking whether
the theory necessarily benefits racial minorities tests such skepticism. If it does,
then it may well be a form of discrimination for the benefit of racial minorities.
If, however, the investigative use of race is not racially discriminatory, then
presumably it could have the effect of disproportionately benefiting white
people, and even harming black people.
The first corollary is that the investigative use of race can indeed have the
effect of benefiting white people disproportionately. Consider, for example,
135
that whites are more likely to commit suicide than blacks. Why? Assume that
an investigation reveals that black Americans tend to have more extended
136
family and community relationships. Such relationships likely reduce the
extent to which blacks experience the kind of isolation that could contribute to
137
suicide among people experiencing depression or mental illness. Informed by
this investigation, a state can take steps to encourage people of any race at risk
of suicide to seek community support. Such a state policy may well benefit
whites more than blacks, but if that racial benefit is not the purpose behind the
policy, it should not be subject to strict scrutiny.
The second corollary is that racial disparities involving greater harm to
blacks than whites need not be addressed if the underlying causes are
determined to be unobjectionable in nonracial terms. For example, assume that
a law school at a public university admits a disproportionate number of whites
138
compared to blacks from its applicant pool. Assume further that the law
school investigates the disparity and determines that giving weight in the
135. See Racial and Ethnic Disparities, SUICIDE PREVENTION RESOURCE CTR. (last visited May 13,
2016); Kelly Burns, Suicide Rate for Minorities Much Lower, Census Data Indicate, NEWS REPORTING
& THE INTERNET (last visited May 13, 2016), http://students.com.miami.edu/netreporting/?page
_id=1285.
136. See Burns, supra note 135 (suggesting that blacks may have greater access to community
support than whites, which may contribute to lower suicide rates for blacks); Robert Joseph Taylor et
al., Racial and Ethnic Differences in Extended Family, Friendship, Fictive Kin and Congregational
Informal Support Networks, 62 FAM. REL. 609, 609 (2013) (reviewing research suggesting that black
Americans tend to have greater extended family, friendship, fictive kin and religious support networks
than whites, which serves as a protective factor against suicide).
137. See Taylor et al., supra note 136, at 609.
138. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 316 (2003) (revealing underrepresentation of black and
Latino students at the University of Michigan Law School).
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admissions process to the Law School Admission Test (LSAT) has a
disproportionate effect against black applicants because their scores are on
139
average lower. May the law school give less weight to the LSAT in the
admission process in order to reduce the racial disparity in admissions? To
avoid strict scrutiny, the investigative use of race supports giving less weight to
the LSAT only for nonracial reasons, not for the purpose of increasing minority
admissions. If examining the LSAT reveals that it does not serve the law
school’s legitimate, nonracial admission goals, then the law school may give it
less weight or stop using it altogether. If, however, the current use of the LSAT
serves the law school’s legitimate purposes, then the investigative use of race
does not support discontinuing its use. Indeed, if the law school reduced
reliance on the LSAT because of its racial impact, then that action would
arguably be subject to strict scrutiny precisely because of its purpose to reduce
140
the racial disparity between black and white matriculating students.
D. More Controversial, Race-Conscious State Actions
This final section considers whether the distinction between investigative
and discriminatory uses of race can help to assess other race-conscious state
actions that have generated significant controversy. The state actions discussed
below include disparate-impact liability, electoral districting, race-based
policing, and efforts to remedy the effects of societal discrimination. The
circumstances in each scenario differ in some respects from the investigative use
of race discussed above, and thus the use of race might not as readily qualify as
purely investigative. Generally, the more difficult it is to separate a state’s
attention to race from its ultimate decision, the more difficult it is to accept that
the use of race is investigative only. The discussion merely sketches how the
following uses of race might be analyzed, leaving to future work a more
thorough examination.
1. Disparate-Impact Liability
141
Congress, through Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, requires an
employer to alter a job qualification or other hiring practice if the practice has a
significant racially disparate impact and the employer cannot demonstrate that
142
the practice is valid, that is, job related. Is Title VII subject to strict scrutiny
on the ground that Congress is acting with a discriminatory purpose by

139. See SUSAN P. DALESSANDRO, LISA C. ANTHONY & LYNDA M. REESE, LSAT PERFORMANCE
WITH REGIONAL, GENDER, AND RACIAL/ETHNIC BREAKDOWNS: 2005–2006 THROUGH 2011–2012
TESTING YEARS 2 (2012) (reporting that, between 2005 and 2012, “[a]verage LSAT scores were highest
for Caucasian and Asian/Pacific Islander test takers. African American test takers and Puerto Rican
test takers had the lowest mean LSAT scores”).
140. Cf. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 729–30 (2007)
(citing Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307) (suggesting that racial balancing was a per
se unconstitutional goal).
141. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k) (2015).
142. Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 577 (2009).
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imposing a duty on employers to reduce the racial impact of their practices?
144
The investigative use of race might justify disparate-impact liability. First,
when a court adjudicating a Title VII claim investigates the disparate impact of
a job qualification, it is arguably acting for legitimate, informational purposes.
Its concern, and that of Congress, is that since race does not affect one’s ability
to perform a job, a qualification that has a racial impact may either reflect
intentional discrimination or some other factor correlated with race that does
not predict job performance. If the investigation determines that the
qualification is not valid, then the courts, implementing congressional will, have
a race-neutral reason—the qualification does not predict job performance—to
require the employer to modify the qualification in order to make it better
select qualified applicants, regardless of race. If, however, the court’s
investigation determines that the qualification is valid, then Congress would
lack a race-neutral reason to alter the qualification and thus the qualification
should be upheld.
A few difficulties face the foregoing analysis. First, is it legitimate for
Congress to investigate employment practices for their job validity only when
they have an impact based on race—or other Title VII traits, such as national
origin and sex—instead of requiring that all job qualifications meet a certain
standard of validity? Is Congress thereby improperly prioritizing racial
disparities over other effects of employment practices? The defense to this
charge must be that qualifications with racially disparate effects raise greater
concerns than qualifications with disparate effects based on nonracial factors.
Such concern is arguably justified on the ground that a qualification with a
racially disparate impact might reflect intentional racial discrimination, a
practice that equal protection doctrine and antidiscrimination law recognize as
more objectionable than other, nonsuspect forms of discrimination. Even if the
disparate impact is not the result of intentional discrimination by the employer,
the irrelevance of race, again a premise of colorblind antidiscrimination law,
suggests that racial disparities reflect some systematic problem impairing access
to employment unnecessarily—if the qualification turns out to be invalid—for
people of all races—even if some racial groups are disqualified at a higher rate.
A second objection to disparate-impact liability goes to the degree of
143. Justice Scalia appeared to believe so. See id. at 594–95 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also Primus,
supra note 28, at 537–39 (explaining that disparate-impact doctrine is arguably subject to strict
scrutiny); Deborah M. Weiss, All Work Cultures Discriminate, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 247, 298
(2013) (suggesting that broad reading of Ricci would classify all employer attempts to avoid racially
disparate impact as discriminatory under Title VII, while narrower reading of Ricci would not go so
far).
144. Richard Primus suggests that disparate-impact liability might be justifiable along the lines of the
miner’s canary metaphor, as a warning signal that “the workplace is organized in ways that perpetuate
unjustified power structures more generally, not just on the basis of race.” See Primus, supra note 28, at
519 n.111 (citing GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 1, at 11–12). Deborah Weiss similarly suggests that
an employer could use disparate impact as a “diagnostic tool” that helps the employer discover
underlying problems with an employment practice which the employer could then address without
discriminating by race. See Weiss, supra note 143, at 298.
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validity that a job qualification must satisfy. If a qualification must meet a high
level of validity, that is, predict job performance with a high degree of
empirically demonstrable confidence, then it might be inferred that Congress’s
goal is to reduce the racial impact of job qualifications, permitting only those
qualifications that are so useful as to outweigh the harm of their racial impact. It
would be a question of fact as to whether Congress, through Title VII, is using
the racial impact of qualifications only for investigative purposes or whether
Congress has the goal of reducing the racial impact of qualifications that would
otherwise be unobjectionable.
A third concern with disparate-impact liability arises from the final stage of
the proof framework under Title VII. If an employer demonstrates that a job
qualification is valid, the plaintiff can still prevail by proving that there is an
alternative employment practice, which the employer refuses to adopt, that
145
would equally serve the employer’s needs with less of a racial impact. This
step is in tension with the investigative use of race because it would require an
employer to alter an employment practice in favor of another, not because the
other would better serve the employer’s needs (only equally), but rather
because the other practice would have less of a racially disparate impact. The
only way to avoid this discriminatory implication is if the employer’s refusal to
adopt the alternative practice indicates that its existing practice is actually
motivated by a discriminatory purpose. If so, then requiring the employer to
change the practice is simply correcting identified discrimination. That in fact
seems to be how the Court views the purpose of this final stage of the disparate146
impact proof framework. To conclude that an employer discriminated in
adopting its disparately impacting qualification, however, the circumstances
should support such an inference from more than the racial impact of the
qualification alone. Otherwise, a job qualification with a racially disparate
impact could always be attributed to intentional discrimination, which is a move
that the Court would reject.
2. Electoral Districting
The Court does not subject to strict scrutiny a state’s majority-minority
electoral district if the state relied on race in drawing the district, provided race
147
was not a predominant factor. The investigative use of race might justify this
approach if the state’s use of race is both legitimate and nondiscriminatory. The
145. Id. at 579.
146. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 578–79 (2009) (describing the three steps of a disparateimpact case, including the third step, at which an employee can “still succeed by showing that the
employer refuses to adopt an available alternative employment practice that has less disparate impact
and serves the employer’s legitimate needs”); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)
(citing McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801, 804–05 (1973)) (explaining that
employee’s success at third step of disparate-impact case serves as “evidence that the employer was
using its tests merely as a ‘pretext’ for discrimination”).
147. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2003); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916–20 (1995)
(applying strict scrutiny to an electoral redistricting plan where it was found that race played a
predominant factor in the district’s design).
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Court explains that a state may legitimately use race as one among many other
factors, including districting principles like compactness, contiguity, and respect
for political subdivisions, and other demographic information, in order to
148
identify “communities of shared political interest” for inclusion in a district.
Perhaps this process could be understood, first, as using race to investigate the
location of a community of interest and, second, drawing a district around that
community of interest for nonracial purposes.
The foregoing account raises two difficulties. First, if the process of relying
on race to identify communities of interest is investigative only, then why does
the Court subject to strict scrutiny the districts that are identified through a
process that uses race as a predominant factor? Why is that not equally
investigative? Perhaps it is, but it might be objectionable on the ground that it
involves an illegitimate stereotype. The Court seems to believe that a state’s
assumption that race is more predictive of shared political interests than all
other factors, including economic status or shared political subdivision, is an
impermissible stereotype about the relationship between race and political
149
preference. It improperly assumes that people who share the same race “think
alike, share the same political interests, and prefer the same candidates at the
150
polls,” whereas people who share other, nonracial traits in common do not
share political interests as predictably.
The second difficulty is that, if a state’s use of race as one of many factors is
a legitimate use of race for investigative purposes, then why does the Court
subject other decisionmaking that relies on race as just one of many factors to
strict scrutiny? If a public university, for example, relies on race as just one
factor in the admission process alongside other criteria such as grades, test
scores, experiences, and reference letters, the admission policy would be subject
151
to strict scrutiny. Why is the university not, like a state drawing electoral
districts, using race investigatively, merely seeking to identify applicants with
distinctive perspectives and experiences with race as one of many factors that
helps it to do so?
A possible distinction between the university’s affirmative-action program
and the state’s electoral districting process is that the university is using race for
the purpose of selecting applicants, whereas the electoral district drawers are
using race-neutral criteria, such as census tracts and other geographic
information, to draw around communities of interest after such communities
have been identified by using race. This distinction is questionable, however, to
the extent that a state’s process of drawing electoral districts, especially large,
148. Miller, 515 U.S. at 916.
149. See Kim Forde-Mazrui, Jural Districting: Selecting Impartial Juries Through Community
Representation, 52 VAND. L. REV. 353, 383–85 (1999) (discussing Court’s acceptance of using race as
one of many factors in electoral districting while presumptively rejecting using race as a predominant
factor in electoral districting).
150. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993).
151. See, e.g., Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (subjecting the University of Michigan’s
admissions policy of taking race, among other factors, into account to strict scrutiny).
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congressional ones, probably takes account of racial data throughout the
process. Perhaps the Court’s nonapplication of strict scrutiny to race-as-a-factor
152
districting is anomalous, as some justices claim. Or perhaps voting is a context
in which the Court recognizes, as some scholars have, the legitimacy, necessity
and inevitability of race-conscious redistricting in order to protect the political
153
interests of minority groups. Put another way, electoral districting may well
use race in a discriminatory, not-just-investigative, manner, but the Court
permits it without strict scrutiny unless the state uses race to an excessive
degree.
3. Suspect Descriptions
No court has held that law enforcement’s use of an eyewitness’s description
154
of a suspect that includes race is discriminatory and subject to strict scrutiny,
155
although some litigation and scholarship have made such claims. One might
justify judicial tolerance of the practice on the ground that the police are relying
on race only to investigate the crime, not to determine guilt or innocence, or to
impose punishment. It is analogous to the use of eyewitness testimony in
court—a use of race for identification and fact-finding, not as a discriminatory
basis for rendering a verdict or judgment. On the other hand, subjecting a
person to arrest is more burdensome to the individual than mere information
gathering. This is a context in which the state action can fairly be characterized
as both investigative and discriminatory. To the extent an arrest begins a
process of bringing a suspect in for questioning, booking, or charging, it is
arguably investigative in nature, and part of a process that will ultimately turn
on nondiscriminatory determinations. At the same time, to the extent a police
arrest is itself a coercive state action, arresting a suspect based on a race-based
description is arguably a discriminatory action—at the point of arrest—despite
the further investigation that will take place after the arrest. Accordingly,
despite the widespread acceptance of police use of race-based suspect
descriptions, it is difficult to characterize such a practice as wholly investigative.
4. Racial Profiling
If police use of race-based suspect descriptions is discriminatory, then
152. See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 999–1003 (1996) (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring in
the judgment) (criticizing plurality’s predominant-factor test as necessary predicate for strict scrutiny
instead of applying strict scrutiny whenever race plays any causal role in a state’s creation of a majorityminority district); see also Brian T. Fitzpatrick, Strict Scrutiny of Facially Race-Neutral State Action and
the Texas Ten Percent Plan, 53 BAYLOR L. REV. 289, 312–13 (2001) (observing that Justice Thomas’s
concurring opinion in Bush v. Vera, which was joined by Scalia, criticized the plurality’s predominantfactor test for requiring that race be more than a “but for” factor in a redistricting plan before the plan
is subject to strict scrutiny); accord Ken Gormley, Racial Mind-Games and Reapportionment: When
Can Race Be Considered (Legitimately) in Redistricting?, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 735, 774 (2002).
153. See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 149, at 385–86; Pamela S. Karlan & Daryl J. Levinson, Why
Voting Is Different, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1201, 1208, 1215 (1996).
154. See, e.g., Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 338–39 (2d Cir. 1999).
155. See, e.g., Banks, supra note 104 (arguing that the use of race by police in an eye-witness
description of a suspect would seem to be a discriminatory use of race despite courts not holding such).
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arrests based on racial profiles of likely criminals would seem to be at least as
discriminatory. But if the former is not discriminatory, is the latter still
discriminatory? Despite their acceptance of race-based suspect descriptions,
156
courts and commentators typically view police use of race-based profiles as
157
discriminatory. The Court in Whren v. United States seemed to agree, stating
in dicta that selective enforcement of the law based on race would violate the
Equal Protection Clause.
But why is the use of race in a profile more discriminatory than its use in a
suspect description? Both practices involve the police relying in part on the race
of an observed individual in deciding whether to investigate him and possibly
158
159
make an arrest. Sheri Lynn Johnson and other commentators have defended
the distinction between race-based suspect descriptions and race-based profiles,
160
while Richard Banks has argued that the distinction is tenuous. A potential
distinction between the two uses of race is that race in a profile reflects an
impermissible assumption about the criminal propensity of different racial
groups whereas race in a suspect description just assumes that an individual
whose race matches that of an observed suspect is more likely to be that
suspect. Profiles thus rely on illegitimate assumptions or stereotypes that
suspect descriptions do not. That does seem to be the point of scholars who
defend the distinction. Richard Banks argues, by contrast, that profiles need not
involve assumptions or stereotypes about the criminal propensity of different
racial groups. Rather, they can involve empirically reliable generalizations
about the correlation, not causation, between race and certain crimes that
police use to make statistically valid predictions in the process of their
investigations, predictions no more inaccurate or essentializing than predictions
made using race-based suspect descriptions. Whether or not the distinction
between suspect descriptions and profiles is sound, both practices, although
investigatory in law enforcement terms, involve the police selecting suspects to
subject to coercive action based in part on a suspect’s race. As such, they would
seem to be discriminatory and subject to strict scrutiny.
5. Remedying Societal Discrimination
If a state seeks to remedy societal racial discrimination by intentionally
benefiting racial minorities through race-neutral means, such action would
156. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (stating that Constitution forbids law
enforcement based on consideration of race); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Race and the Decision to Detain A
Suspect, 93 YALE L.J. 214, 242–43 (1983) (police reliance on race in deciding whom to detain is subject
to strict scrutiny, except for use of race to identify a particular suspect); R. Richard Banks, Race-Based
Suspect Selection and Colorblind Equal Protection Doctrine and Discourse, 48 UCLA L. REV. 1075,
1090 (2001) (noting widespread institution that racial profiles are legally objectionable but race-based
suspect descriptions are not).
157. Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
158. See Johnson, supra note 156.
159. See, e.g., David Cole, NO EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM 50 (1999); Randall Kennedy, Suspect Policy, 221 NEW REPUBLIC 30, 34 (1999).
160. See Banks, supra note 104.
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161

arguably be subject to strict scrutiny. If, however, a state remedies societal
racial discrimination through race-neutral means, without intending to benefit
162
one racial group over another, then strict scrutiny should not apply. The
reason is that remedying societal racial discrimination is a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory interest. If that interest is pursued through race-neutral
means without a racially discriminatory purpose, strict scrutiny should not be
triggered.
The question arises, however, whether race may play any role in remedying
societal racial discrimination without triggering strict scrutiny. May a state
investigate the causes of racial disparities as part of a process of identifying the
socioeconomic conditions that likely result from societal discrimination? May
the state then address those conditions on a race-neutral basis without being
subject to strict scrutiny?
The investigative use of race supports such an approach. Provided the state’s
purpose in investigating racial disparities is to determine whether societal
discrimination is a plausible cause, and not a precommitment to assuming so,
then such an investigation should be legitimate and informational only. If a
state legitimately concludes, in combination with other indicia of societal
discrimination, that some condition causing a racial disparity likely results from
societal discrimination, then the state should be able to respond to that
condition without its actions being subject to strict scrutiny.
The investigative use of race involves two stages: investigation and action.
Remedying societal discrimination should be able to satisfy the second stage. If
a state uses race-neutral means to address conditions that the state legitimately
believes have resulted from societal racial discrimination, without selecting the
race-neutral means in order to favor racial minorities, then such action should
not be considered discriminatory.
Two objections may nonetheless be raised to the first stage—investigating
racial disparities in search of the effects of societal discrimination. The question
is whether that stage involves an illegitimate assumption or belief about race.
The first objection made by the Court is that the state’s interest in remedying
societal discrimination is too amorphous. Second, the Court has criticized the
assumption that racial disparities necessarily reflect discrimination.
Regarding the first objection, that remedying societal discrimination is too
amorphous, the Court’s concern is premised on relying on societal
163
discrimination as a justification for racial classifications. Under strict scrutiny,
the Court requires that discrimination be identified with particularity in order
161. See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 25, at 46–49 (arguing that logic of equal protection doctrine
supports subjecting race-neutral laws intended to benefit racial minorities to strict scrutiny).
162. It has also been argued that, although a state’s interest in remedying societal discrimination is
not sufficiently compelling to justify the use of racial classifications, it is arguably compelling enough to
satisfy strict scrutiny when race-neutral policies are used to benefit racial minorities. See Forde-Mazrui,
supra note 25, at 51–81. As the investigative use of race proposed in this article would avoid strict
scrutiny, the discussion in the text is limited to non-discriminatory remedial efforts.
163. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 496–97 (1989).
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to define the scope of a racial classification or an otherwise racially
164
discriminatory policy. Here, the state would not be investigating racial
disparities in order to use racial classifications or in order to use race-neutral
means to benefit racial minorities. Rather, the state would be investigating
racial disparities for a completely nondiscriminatory purpose, namely,
identifying effects of societal racial discrimination regardless of which racial
groups experience those effects. The concerns that have led the Court to
require a more particularized finding of discrimination would not be implicated.
The second objection, that it is illegitimate to assume that racial disparities
are caused by societal discrimination, has force. The Court has clearly indicated
that a state cannot properly assume that racial groups would be represented in
165
proportion to their population in all facets of life absent discrimination. To
allow such an assumption to motivate state decisionmaking would come close to
166
endorsing racial balancing —the assumption that racial disparities are
objectionable per se—only, the assumption here would be that all racial
disparities reflect societal discrimination.
A permissible approach lies between two extremes. On the one hand,
because the process of identifying the effects of societal discrimination does not
by itself involve a racially discriminatory purpose, a state should not have to
identify the discrimination with the same particularity required to justify
racially discriminatory state action. On the other hand, a state cannot, under
current doctrine, assume, without more, that all racial disparities reflect societal
discrimination. For the inference of societal discrimination to be legitimate, it
should be based on more than racial disparities alone. A middle ground would
allow a state to infer societal discrimination if evidence in addition to racial
disparities reasonably supports a conclusion that such discrimination is a likely
cause of such disparities.
Thus, for example, assume that a state’s investigation into racial disparities
in educational outcomes reveals that especially low-performing school districts
are predominantly populated by black schoolchildren. Assume further that
other empirical evidence points to societal discrimination as a cause of the
school district’s condition. For example, social science research from such fields
as history, economics, political science, psychology, and sociology may indicate
that the school district’s condition is likely a product of generations of state- and
private-sponsored discriminatory policies, including residential and school
segregation, low school funding, underinvestment in economic infrastructure
and crime control, and discriminatory mortgage practices that both redlined the
district and precluded its residents from accessing federal loans to purchase
homes in the suburbs, among other practices. Based on such evidence of the
effects of societal discrimination, the state could invest in the economic and
educational improvement of the district on a race-neutral basis. The goal of
164. Id. at 492.
165. Id. at 507.
166. Id.
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such investment, to avoid strict scrutiny, should not be to benefit the district’s
black residents. Rather, the purpose should be to address the socioeconomic
and crimogenic conditions of the district that likely result from societal racial
discrimination regardless of what race might be benefited by the state’s
investment. Even if the state knew that a disproportionate number of
beneficiaries of its investment policy would be black, awareness of racial
167
consequences does not trigger strict scrutiny. Under Washington v. Davis and
168
Personnel Administrator v. Feeney, a state’s adoption of a policy despite,
rather than because of, its impact on a racial group is not subject to strict
scrutiny.
IV
CONCLUSION
This article began with the question whether government may investigate
and address the causes of racial disparities. The example we focused on is racial
disparities in infant mortality. The question applies, moreover, to health
disparities more generally and to other aspects of American society in which
racial disparities persist. The article does not criticize current equal protection
doctrine. Instead, it takes that doctrine seriously and concludes that,
notwithstanding its colorblind thrust, it can accommodate some attention to
race for the purpose of addressing the underlying causes of racial inequalities.
The article concludes with the question of whether government should
investigate and address the causes of racial inequality. Some may say no, and
they need not be bigots. Some people may genuinely believe in good faith that
racial inequality is simply an inevitable feature of American society—that racial
inequality is normal, even natural. Justice Thomas may well believe this when
he states that “the absence of racial disparities in multi-ethnic societies has been
169
the exception, not the rule,” and that “[w]hen it comes to ‘proportiona[l]
represent[ation]’ of ethnic groups, ‘few, if any, societies have ever approximated
170
this description.’” He may be right that some “racial imbalance can also result
171
from any number of innocent private decisions.” But the racial imbalance
across American society is not plausibly disconnected from America’s long
history of racial injustice. Racial disparities in America are not occasional,
minor, or inconsistent. Rather, stark racial disparities in which blacks are
consistently and substantially worse off than whites exist along virtually every
indicator of social and economic well-being. Such disparities are at least a

167. 426 U.S. 229, 246 (1976).
168. 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
169. Texas Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015) (Thomas, J. dissenting) (quoting DONALD HOROWITZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN
CONFLICT 677 (1985)).
170. Id.
171. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 750 (2007) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
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matter of sufficient concern to justify investigating and, if warranted, addressing
their root causes.
Racial inequality in America is not normal, natural, or innocent. The basis
of this claim is the same proposition that underlies the Supreme Court’s
suspicion of race-based policies, namely, that race is irrelevant. If race is
irrelevant, then black infants should not be significantly more prone to die than
white infants. Black children should not be more prone to fail out of school.
Black adults should not be more prone to be poor, jobless, homeless, inmates,
or victims of crime. If race is irrelevant, then racial disparities signal, like the
canary in the mine, that something is amiss. Racial disparities in America signal
that centuries of discrimination have entrenched inequalities that perpetuate
themselves from one generation to the next. These inequalities, moreover,
result in unequal access to the types of resources and opportunities that are
necessary for people to have fulfilling lives.
If the Constitution protects equality, then it cannot logically mandate
ignoring inequality. If anything, it should mandate addressing inequality, but if
not, at a minimum it should permit the government to address inequality. The
Constitution, properly interpreted, does not require us to ignore the canary in
the mine. The Constitution is not canary blind.

